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BOOK REVIEWS
X.E. KRAMER & C.H. VAN RHEE, EDS., CIVIL LITIGATION IN A GLOBALIS-
ING WORLD (T.M.C. Asser Press 2012)
Reviewed by Thomas 0. Main*
HARMONIZATION OF PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE
This volume of essays is the product of a conference by the same
name that took place in Rotterdam on July 17-18, 2010. The confer-
ence was a joint project of the Erasmus School of Law of the Erasmus
University Rotterdam and the Faculty of Law of the University of
Maastricht. With a couple of distinguished exceptions, the book's con-
tributors are mid-career scholars from European universities and
organizations.
This is an excellent book, though its title is misleading. The book
is principally about the theory and practice of harmonization in Eu-
rope (p. 3).1 The harmonization of procedure is a topic of particular
importance in Europe, where different national and regional legal
systems co-exist, cooperate, and compete with each other. But the in-
sights and perspectives of these excellent scholars are relevant to
procedure scholars everywhere. Indeed, harmonization-and more
generally, uniformity-is a norm of universal and perpetual signifi-
cance in the discourse of procedural reform.
The fundamental challenge presented, of course, is that we live
in a world with territorial systems that must adjudicate disputes
arising from trans-territorial phenomena. Businesses have foreign
operations, suppliers, employees, or customers. Even our personal
lives are increasingly transnational: consider vacationers, potential
immigrants, expatriates, retirees, investors, and persons contemplat-
ing marriage to or adoption of foreigners. The result is a pluralistic
system of rules embodying many contradictions. Viewed as a whole,
this system is national, regional, and international. It is substance-
specific and trans-substantive. Parts of it are organic and parts have
been imposed. Some of the rules and practices are formal, some are
informal and ad hoc. The rules are substantive and procedural, bind-
ing and advisory. The careful student can observe in the preceding
list redundancy, inconsistency, and complexity, on the one hand and,
on the other hand, complementarity, coherence, and a thoughtfully
calibrated accommodation of multiple and divergent goals and
interests.
* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University
of Nevada, Las Vegas.
1. In chapter 1, the editors provide a comprehensive summary of each of the
eighteen chapters that follows their introduction. In chapter 19, Marcel Storme's con-
cluding thoughts include summaries and reactions to the eighteen chapters that
precede his. I mention this in case anyone looking for a more traditional book review
is disappointed that my essay does not methodically summarize each of the contribu-
tions. Persons looking for such a summary will find it in pages 1-16 and 379-87 of the
book.
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Globalization brings into relief differences in both substantive
and procedural law across different legal systems. The harmoniza-
tion of substantive law-whether in intellectual property,
commercial law, or securities regulation, for example-is a topic of
great contemporary significance. This book, however, focuses exclu-
sively on the harmonization or approximation 2 of procedural law.
Harmonization in this arena is a tall order. Differences in procedural
law from country to country are "much greater" even than differences
in substantive law.3 Moreover, "procedural systems [may be] too dif-
ferent and too deeply embedded in local political history and cultural
tradition" to expect anything resembling harmonization. 4 Yet harmo-
nization reform efforts are ubiquitous and, to varying degrees,
successful. The contributions of several of the book's authors chroni-
cle some harmonization reforms5 and advocate for others.6
2. The adoption or movement of words and ideas into a legal system is described
with various terms: diffusion, transplantation, approximation, harmonization, evolu-
tion, hegemony, reception, and unification, among others. The labels suggest subtly
different levels of intent and intensity. The importation of a word or idea can be delib-
erate, voluntary, and wise; or it might be none of these. See Thomas 0. Main, The
Word Commons and Foreign Laws, CORNELL INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2013) (citing
Nuno Garoupa & Anthony Ogus, A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants, 35
J. LEGAL STUD. 339, 343 (2006); Pierre Legrand, On the Unbearable Localness of the
Law: Academic Fallacies and Unreasonable Observations, 10 EuR. REV. PRIVATE L.
61, 68 (2002); David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in ADAPTING
LEGAL CULTURES 15-20 (David Nelken & Johannes Fees eds., 2001); William Twining,
Diffusion and Globalization Discourse, 47 HARv. J. INT'L L. 507, 510-12 (2006)).
3. See, e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Introduction: The Elements of Procedure: Are
They Separately Portable?, 45 Am. J. COMP. L. 649, 652 (1997) (advocating compara-
tive study and expressing optimism about the import and export of certain best
practices).
4. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets are Hid, 76 TEx. L. REV.
1665, 1667 (1998) (acknowledging the forces of resistance to harmonization, while ad-
vocating for the progressive approximation of procedures). See also Benoit
Allemeersch & Els Vandensande, Convergence of Civil Procedure Systems in Europe:
Comments from a Belgian Perspective, in CIVIL LITIGATION IN A GLOBALISING WORLD
325, 328 (2012); Oscar Chase, Some Observations on the Cultural Dimension in Civil
Procedure Reform, 45 Am. J. COMP. L. 861 (1997); C.H. van Rhee, Civil Procedure: a
European lus Commune? 8 EUR. REV. Paiv. L. 589 (2000); Thomas 0. Main, The Pro-
cedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 835-36 (2010).
5. Two contributions are especially worth noting in this regard. C.H. van Rhee
(p. 39) presents a typology of harmonization reforms and offers historical examples of
each type. C.H. van Rhee, Harmonisation of Civil Procedure: An Historical and Com-
parative Perspective. Xandra Kramer (p. 141) demonstrates how private international
law rules initiated a gradual and spontaneous approximation of certain civil proce-
dure concepts. She notes the irony that private international law would be
inconsequential if systems were, in fact, uniform; yet it is private international law
that precipitates unification. Xandra E. Kramer, Harmonisation of Civil Procedure
and the Interaction with Private International Law.
6. Two particularly effective examples of advocacy bear mention. Gerhard Wag-
ner (p. 93) argues for harmonization by subject-matter-an approach that the book
refers to as "vertical harmonization." See Gerhard Wagner, Harmonisation of Civil
Procedure: Policy Perspectives. Benoit Allemeersch and Els Vandensande (p. 317)
make the case for regional cooperation in the Benelux countries. Benoit Allemeersch
& Els Vandensande, Convergence of Civil Procedure Systems in Europe: Comments
from a Belgian Perspective.
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The book's focus on procedure is, of course, artificial. As Matthias
Storme exposes in one of my favorite chapters (p. 141), procedure can-
not be viewed in isolation.7 Multilateral efforts that harmonize
procedure change how or even whether substantive law is enforced.
The idea here is that substantive law is drafted with a particular pro-
cedural platform in mind, whether consciously or subconsciously.
Necessarily, then, the mandate of the substantive law will be over- or
under-enforced if that substantive law is enforced in another proce-
dural system.8 This relationship of substance and procedure does not
prevent procedural harmonization, but it is something that, as
Storme advises, must be "taken into account."9
Of course the successful implementation of any reform is multi-
dimensional. As contributors to this volume demonstrate, actual pro-
cedural harmonization might be achieved only theoreticallyo or
polyphonically." The engine of that reform can be formal,12 or, as
Paul Dubinsky argues (p. 223) in the context of the creation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the U.S. in the 1930s, it can be
driven by elitism and economic factors.13 Naturally, the infrastruc-
ture for implementing any reform is no less significant to its ultimate
success than is the content of the reform itself.
But let us assume that an isolated discussion of the harmoniza-
tion of procedure is meaningful and that the objective is achievable. A
simple metaphor can bring the basic issues of procedural harmoniza-
7. Matthias E. Storme, Harmonisation of Civil Procedure and the Interaction
with Substantive Private Law. Gerhard Wagner (p. 93) also thoughtfully raises the
importance of the substance-procedure relationship. Gerhard Wagner, Harmonisation
of Civil Procedure: Policy Perspectives.
8. See generally Main, supra note 4.
9. Matthias E. Storme, Harmonisation of Civil Procedure and the Interaction
with Substantive Private Law. Less clear, however, is exactly how this can be "taken
into account," since it would require a simultaneous rewrite of substantive and proce-
dural law. For my own struggle with this dilemma, see Main, supra note 4. See also
Konstantinos D. Kerameus, Some Reflections on Procedural Harmonisation: Reasons
and Scope, 8 UNIF. L. REV. 448 (2003) (characterizing procedure as ordre public).
10. See Neil Andrews, Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure: Order Out of
Chaos, p. 19 (distilling the essential principles of procedure and encouraging harmo-
nization of these).
11. See Alan Uzelac, Harmonised Civil Procedure in a World of Structural Diver-
gences? Lessons Learned from the CEPEJ Evaluations, pp. 175, 204 (distinguishing
harmony achieved by "polyphonic voices" from "chanting in unison").
12. See, e.g., Burkhard Hess, Procedural Harmonisation in a European Context, p.
159 (suggesting that it is time to discuss the codification of a procedural law for
Europe).
13. See Paul R. Dubinsky, United States: Harmonisation and Voluntarism. The
Role of Elites in Creating an Influential National Model, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, (emphasizing the role that intellectual elites and large law firms have
played in the harmonization of procedure in American state and federal courts); Paul
R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The Coming
Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 211, 219 (2005) ("The harmonization of procedural law [in
the comparative law Congresses of the early twentieth century] was a project con-
ceived and guided by elites"). See also Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Uniformity and
the Exaggerated Role of Rules, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 311 (2001) (demonstrating the
role of a local legal culture in the assimilation of similar and dissimilar textual
mandates).
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tion into relief. The elements of that metaphor are a hedge and two
adjoining plots of land. Specifically, I imagine a long hedgerow that
was planted on the property line long before either of the two neigh-
bors purchased their properties. The hedge may serve a variety of
different purposes, such as ensuring privacy, improving the value of a
house, keeping dogs in or out, clarifying the property line, producing
berries for harvest, facilitating exercise or creativity or providing
shade.
The shrubbery on each side of the hedgerow can be analogized to
a system of procedural law. Each procedural system is designed to
reflect certain values and achieve certain purposes. One system may
elevate the importance of, say, expert decision-making and speed of
resolution through written submissions. Another system might em-
phasize accuracy and oral advocacy. Each system is uniquely tailored
to serve some combination of values and purposes-with some more
significant than others in a hierarchy that can change over time and
under different circumstances-just as the two plots of land in our
analogy may be cultivated to make use of the hedgerow in specific
ways.
I find the hedgerow metaphor useful because for most or perhaps
even all of the purposes served by a hedge, coordination by the prop-
erty owners may be unnecessary because the purpose(s) of each of
them can be completely achieved with the half of the hedge that is on
their own property. One half of the hedge may be meticulously
cropped (to artfully frame the property for one neighbor, for example)
while the other half is untended and overgrown (say, to corral the dog
of the other neighbor); but a hedge can usually survive such disso-
nance. Indeed, a hedge is not a shared limited resource for which the
use by each of these property owners inevitably leads to some tragic
result, harming the other property owner. At the same time, how-
ever, in some circumstances it might also be true that some level of
coordination between the two neighbors could be useful for one or
both of them; a whole hedge might be more effective or efficient than
a half. Whether a cooperative approach to the hedge is more effective
or efficient depends upon the specific combination of purposes that
the hedge serves for each of them.
Procedural systems face a similar inherent contradiction. On the
one hand, a procedural system can fulfill all or many of the needs of
its community without regard to the goals and operations of a neigh-
boring procedural system. Neighboring systems need not coordinate
or imitate. Indeed, the distinctiveness of a system may, in fact, be one
of its purposes. For example, in the chapter of the book that was the
most revelatory for me, Stefan Huber (p. 291) describes how the Ger-
man courts actively promote themselves as a jurisdiction of choice for
commercial litigation. 14 Among the German initiatives, we learn, is
the specialized training of a subset of the German judiciary so as to
14. Stefan Huber, The German Approach to the Globalisation and Harmonisation
of Civil Procedure: Balancing National Particularities and International Open-Mind-
edness (2012).
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be capable of conducting the entire proceedings in English.' 5 Ger-
many is not looking for neighboring systems to imitate them; they are
differentiating their product to gain a market advantage.
Yet, on the other hand, systems may have purposes and objec-
tives that might be more effectively or efficiently achieved through
some level of coordination. This is especially true in the context of
transnational litigation. For example, states want the judgments of
their courts to be enforceable elsewhere, and this may require a re-
ordering of the system's goals and purposes so as to facilitate coopera-
tion with other states. The engines for this sort of coordination (read:
harmonization) are explained from a deep historical perspective in a
chapter by C.H. van Rhee,16 from a theoretical law-and-economics
perspective in a chapter by Louis Visscher,17 from empirical and con-
temporary accounts in chapters authored by Tanja Domej (writing
about Switzerland),' 8 Peter Beaton (writing about Scotland),' 9 Pau-
lien van der Grinten (writing about The Netherlands), 20 Benoit
Allemeersch and Els Vandensande (writing about Belgium),21 Frede-
rique Ferrand (writing about France, 22 and Sebasitian Spinei
(writing about Romania).23 As I read this book, I imagined myself
speaking to a succession of neighbors-each of whose properties is
separated by a hedgerow, and each in possession of ambitious ideas
for landscaping (sometimes their own property; sometimes their
neighbors' property).
The rhetoric of uniformity is powerful. So deeply is the idea of
uniformity embedded in the field of comparative law that many
proceduralists find it difficult or unnecessary to explain why uniform-
ity is thought to be good.24 Whether because of the lure of
simplicity, 2 5 the appearance of neutrality, 26 the likeness to science, 27
15. Id., 291, 305.
16. C.H. van Rhee, Harmonisation of Civil Procedure: An Historical and Compar-
ative Perspective, at 39 (2012).
17. Louis Visscher, A Law and Economics View on Harmonisation of Procedural
Law, p. 65.
18. Tanja Domej Switzerland: Between Cosmopolitanism and Parochialism in
Civil Litigation, p. 247.
19. Peter Beaton, Globalisation and Scottish Law, p. 263.
20. Paulien van der Grinten, A Dutch Perspective on Civil Litigation and its
Harmonisation, p. 277.
21. Benoit Allemeersch & Els Vandensande, Convergence of Civil Procedure Sys-
tems in Europe: Comments from a Belgian Perspective, p. 317.
22. Frederique Ferrand, The French Approach to the Globalisation and
Harmonisation of Civil Procedure, p. 335.
23. Sebastian Spinei, Romanian Civil Procedure: The Reform Cycles, p. 363.
24. See generally Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated
Role of Rules, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 311 (2001). See also Benoit Allemeersch & Els
Vandensande, Convergence of Civil Procedure Systems in Europe: Comments from a
Belgian Perspective, at 325 ("Procedural scholars do not always offer a clear justifica-
tion for [harmonization].").
25. See Janice Toran, 'Tis a Gift to Be Simple': Aesthetics and Procedural Reform,
89 MICH. L. REV. 352, 353-54 (1990) (discussing aesthetic appeal of simplicity in soci-
ology, politics and economics). Professor Janice Toran has suggested that procedural
reforms are drawn to simple, elegant solutions, not only because such solutions may
prove especially workable, but also because they are more aesthetically pleasing than
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the feel of efficiency, 28 the imprimatur of professionalism 29 or some
combination of these, the goal of procedural law enjoys virtually uni-
versal approval.30 Reformers are inclined to "speak of uniformity as if
it were some excellence in itself, something transcendental and abso-
lute; or at least as an undoubted blessing on a par with health,
happiness or virtue."3'
But one must appreciate that the term uniformity is not self-de-
fining; something can only be uniform with respect to something else.
This is as true for one side of a hedge as it is true for a procedural
system: if we want uniformity, we must be clear-uniformity with
respect to what? And herein lies the paradox of virtually all discus-
sions of uniformity: there are many species of uniformity, and the
more complicated alternatives. See also HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 13
(1873) (discussing origination of systems of code law).
26. See Thomas Wall Shelton, An Efficient Judicial System, 22 CASE & COMMENT
227, 230 (1915) ("There is a fixed notion that politics have no respectable place in the
judicial department of government."). The professed ideal is one of procedural neu-
trality in which the system of adjective law provides the disputants a level playing
field on which to resolve their disputes. See Paul Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose
of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substan-
tive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2074 (1989) (discussing
"political neutrality" as goal of federal rulemaking). It follows that the legal system
ought to strive for uniform rules that treat similar cases in a similar manner. See
Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example
of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L REV. 1925, 1932 (1989) ("[Uniformity] must be a goal, how-
ever difficult to attain, of a system that aspires to equal justice . . . .").
27. See Kenneth Graham, The Persistence of Progressive Proceduralism, 61 TEX.
L. REV. 929, 945 (1983) (stating that "lack of uniformity is a threat to the claim that
procedure is a value-free science"). Early in the twentieth century, Shelton wrote that
procedural uniformity was the "key that [would] unlock the door to a new era of scien-
tific juridical relations." Thomas Wall Shelton, A New Era of Judicial Relations, 23
CASE & COMMENT 388, 392 (1916). See also WERNER MENSKI, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A
GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASIA AND AFRICA 5 (2d ed. 2006)
("[Mlainstream legal science continues to behave as though globalization simply
means uniformisation ... ")
28. See Benoit Allemeersch & Els Vandensande, Convergence of Civil Procedure
Systems in Europe: Comments from a Belgian Perspective, at 325 (citing K. Kerameus,
Procedural Harmonization in Europe, 43 Am. J. CoMP. L. 401 (1995)).
29. Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2004-05
(1989) (discussing rationales for uniform system of procedural rules). In 1926, Edson
Sunderland wrote that the legal profession is the most highly unified of all profes-
sional groups. See Edson Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39
HARv. L. REV. 725, 725 (1926) (discussing influence of legal profession and attorneys).
30. When there is fragmentation or lack of uniformity, scholars often see this as
"the problematic issue of consistency." See, e.g., Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther
Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of
Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999, 1003 n.17 (2004). See generally KONRAD
ZWEIGERT & HEIN Korz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAw 61 (Tony Weir
trans., 3d ed. 1998) (describing the lodestar of some comparative law inquiry as the
science of a droit commun legislatif).
31. Subrin, supra note 29, n.5 (referring to debates about the unification of fed-
eral procedure in early twentieth Century America) (quoting Connor Hall, Uniform
Law Procedure in Federal Courts, 33 W. VA. L.Q. 131, 132 (1927)). See generally Mar-
cel Storme, Procedural Law and the Reform of Justice: From Regional to Universal
Harmonisation, 6 UNIF. L. REV. 765, 768 (2001) (discussing the compelling need for
procedural uniformity).
472 [ol. 6)1
pursuit of one type of uniformity invariably compromises another
type of uniformity.
The well-intentioned property owner, who may be inspired by the
rhetoric of uniformity to harmonize her side of the hedge has multiple
but mutually-exclusive options: she can harmonize her side of the
hedge with the side facing her neighbor's property. She can harmo-
nize her side of the hedge with other hedges in the neighborhood. She
can harmonize with other hedges on her own property or with hedges
located elsewhere in the city or elsewhere. Even maintaining the sta-
tus quo amidst changing uses all around her is another form of
harmonization-harmonization with the past." The virtues of uni-
formity encourage (and discourage!) each of these disparate pursuits.
Such is the rhetoric of uniformity in the context of procedural
harmonization. And this dissonance percolates through all of the
chapters in this book. One strong push for uniformity has been in the
context of cases having some transnational dimensions. In these
cases, advocates of uniformity maintain that it is important for trans-
national cases to be subject to the same procedures whether the case
is adjudicated in country X or in country Y.32 Such advocates further
maintain that ideally the outcome in such a case should not vary sys-
tematically from forum to forum. But this pursuit of uniformity,
however well intentioned, creates disuniformity within each national
system. Disuniformity results when claims are treated differently be-
cause in one case the fact pattern and party structure is wholly
domestic and in another case, elements of the case are transna-
tional.33 The domestic or transnational nature of an injury may
be through no choice, control, or even knowledge of the respective
plaintiffs. Inter-territorial uniformity creates intra-territorial
disuniformity.
Another species of uniformity focuses on the mechanics of
processing certain substantive claims. The processing of consumer
claims, for example, might be harmonized across a region. 34 The rhet-
oric of uniformity could be sufficiently persuasive for countries X and
Y to adopt these procedures, not only for transnational cases involv-
ing this subject matter, but for domestic cases as well. But this
uniformity is not without collateral damage to another species of uni-
formity. The harmonization of rules for a particular subject matter
creates, for example, trans-substantive disuniformity. There are ad-
32. See Michele Taruffo, Harmonisation in a Global Context: The ALI/
UNIDROIT Principles, p. 207.
33. But see Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational Litigation a Distinct Field? The
Persistence of Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J. INr'L L. 301,
306 (2008) ("When American courts are confronted with disputes with a transnational
dimension, they reach for a familiar toolbox, one with tools for fixing domestic
problems. They extrapolate from their experience with familiar domestic litigation,
especially interstate litigation.").
34. Gerhard Wagner, Harmonisation of Civil Procedure: Policy Perspectives 93
(referring to this concept as "vertical uniformity").
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vocates of uniformity who believe rather passionately that the same
procedural rules should apply to all types of cases.35
There is also a temporal dimension to uniformity. In Tanja
Domej's excellent chapter (p. 247) about the new Swiss Code of Civil
Procedure, for example, she laments the comparatively little atten-
tion paid to international developments in the field of civil
procedure. 36 To be sure, the comprehensive reform in Switzerland
was a missed opportunity for one form of harmonization. Yet that
missed opportunity was itself attributable to the pursuit of a differ-
ent form of harmonization: the drafters of the new unified Code tried
to harmonize as much as possible with the twenty-six cantonal codes
that the new unified Code replaced.37 The greater the effort to unify
the new procedure with the past practice(s), the less able the new
code of procedure was able to harmonize with modern European ini-
tiatives; these different visions of uniformity were mutually-
exclusive.
Uniformity is also a protean concept. Consider Germany's inno-
vative effort to make its courts more hospitable to transnational
disputes.38 Is this anti-uniformity in the sense that Germany is dis-
tinguishing itself in a competition for dispute resolution business? Or
is this pro-uniformity in the sense that it is a step in the direction of a
unified system of global dispute resolution?
A hawkish view of uniformity regards what I have labeled the
"disuniformity" that can result from uniformity initiatives as a tran-
sitory condition. In this view, there is something of a master
narrative of uniformity that ultimately unifies everything: harmoniz-
ing the procedures for transnational cases will lead ultimately to the
adoption of those procedures for domestic cases as well;3 9 or, harmo-
nizing the procedures in a region will then spread to a geographically
larger region.40 Some even perceive the harmonization process as
somewhat inevitable. 41
35. See generally David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substan-
tivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 371, 376 (2010) (defining trans-
substantivity). See also Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly
Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of
Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2067, 2068 (1989) (offering a classic defense of
trans-substantivity).
36. Tanja Domej, Switzerland: Between Cosmopolitanism and Parochialism in
Civil Litigation.
37. Id.
38. Stefan Huber, The German Approach to the Globalisation and Harmonisation
of Civil Procedure: Balancing National Particularities and International Open-Mind-
edness, p. 291.
39. See, e.g., Michele Taruffo, Harmonisation in a Global Context: The ALI/
UNIDROIT Principles, p. 207. See also Frederique Ferrand, The French Approach to
the Globalisation and Harmonisation of Civil Procedure, p. 335 (noting the adoption
of foreign techniques, first, in the context of private international law, but thereafter
in domestic contexts).
40. See, e.g., Benoit Allemeersch & Els Vandensande, Convergence of Civil Proce-
dure Systems in Europe: Comments from a Belgian Perspective, p. 317.
41. See Paulien van der Grinten, A Dutch Perspective on Civil Litigation and its
Harmonisation, p. 277.
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Difference is often "an invitation for lawyers to unify, streamline,
and harmonise."42 But skepticism of reforms that are cloaked in the
rhetoric of uniformity is warranted.43 All of us should react to this
rhetoric with self-conscious reflection as Professors Allemeersch and
Vandensande do." They ask whether-and why-we need new uni-
formity? Reforms that achieve uniformity may be worthwhile and
important initiatives. But when one type of uniformity comes at the
expense of some other type of uniformity, the rhetoric of uniformity
itself cannot alone justify the reform.
Of course the standard narrative of harmonization reform is that
the difference that is the target of the reform creates confusion or
raises transaction costs. Empiricism can inform such discussions. For
example, to supplement his law-and-economics perspective on har-
monization, 45 Louis Visscher cites the results of the 2008 Oxford
Civil Justice Survey of the Institute of European and Comparative
Law, which suggest that differences in systems do not, in fact, gener-
ate significant problems or transactions costs. 4 6 The lack of
uniformity can be anachronistic, inefficient, and/or unnecessary. But
the burden of proof lies on the reformers; that burden is not satisfied
merely by showing the lack of uniformity.
Let us return one final time to our adjacent neighbors who share
the hedgerow. When one neighbor (X) approaches the other (Y) with
42. MENSKI, supra note 27. See also Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmen-
tation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 553, 559
(2002) ("Systemic thinking has always been a preserve of academics;" JoHN FINNIs,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 279 (1980) ("The lawyer is likely to become impa-
tient when he hears that social arrangements can be more or less legal, that legal
systems and the rule of law exist as a matter of degree . . . and so on."); Main, supra
note 2.
43. For my skepticism, see Main, supra note 2.
44. Benoit Allemeersch & Els Vandensande, Convergence of Civil Procedure Sys-
tems in Europe: Comments from a Belgian Perspective, at 325.
45. Louis Visscher, A Law and Economics View on Harmonisation of Procedural
Law, at 88 (concluding that "there do not seem to be many arguments in favour of
harmonization of procedural law").
46. Id. In the 2008 Oxford Civil Justice Survey of the Institute of European and
Comparative Law, it was examined "to what extent businesses in Europe were influ-
enced by their perceptions of national civil justice systems and contract laws when
choosing the applicable law and the forum of litigation for cross-border transactions."
From this Survey it becomes clear that many of the respondents find it very impor-
tant (61 per cent) or important (36 per cent), when conducting cross-border
transactions, to be able to choose the dispute resolution forum. With the statement
that variations in European civil justice systems deter the respondent's company from
doing business in certain jurisdictions, 51 per cent disagree strongly, 25 per cent disa-
gree mildly, 19 per cent agree mildly and 1 per cent agrees strongly. With the
statement that such differences constitute, overall, a barrier to trade, 25 per cent
disagree strongly, 35 per cent disagree mildly, 33 per cent agree mildly and 6 per cent
agree strongly. . . . [T]he respondents are positive about the idea of a harmonized
European civil justice system (36 per cent very favourably, 40 per cent favourably, 19
per cent not very favourably and 4 per cent not at all favourably), because it reduces
costs. However, only 22 per cent would choose for the option of a European civil justice
system which replaces national civil justice systems, while 25 per cent would choose
for the European system to be an additional choice. Most respondents (37 per cent)
would opt for a greater alignment of civil justice systems."
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an idea for how Y should change how she maintains her side of the
hedge, we can expect the rhetoric of uniformity to be invoked. Neigh-
bor Y should explore two related types of responses: (1) If uniformity
is Xs primary objective, then X should be willing to allow Y to choose
how both of them maintain the hedgerow. Of course, uniformity is
likely not Xs primary objective; rather the rhetoric of uniformity is
merely cloaking Xs true objective. But the neighbors' discussion
should focus on Xs true objective, rather than on the rhetoric of uni-
formity. (2) When the rhetoric of uniformity sounds persuasive,
neighbor Y need not contest or refute that uniformity; instead she
need identify another dimension of uniformity that Xs reform would
disturb. In these instances the debate is not uniformity versus dis-
uniformity, but rather one type of uniformity as opposed to another
type of uniformity.
Read as a compilation, the book brilliantly reveals the allure,
paradox, and superficiality of uniformity rhetoric. I might have play-
fully titled this book "19 Meditations on Procedural Harmonisation in
Europe." Each chapter encourages thoughtful engagement with core
questions about procedural uniformity-the why, when, how, and
which? Each contribution is thoughtful; and the compilation truly
generative.
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